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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH
VERA

M~.

STOUT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

WASHINGTON FIRE. AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case
No. 9873

AP·P·ELLANT''S BRIEF
NATURE OF. THE (!ASE
This is an action under a fire insurance policy to
recover for personal property destroyed by fire.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the pre-trial hearing upon a stipulation of facts,
the parties submitted to the Oourt upon written memoranda the point of liability which hinged upon the meaning of the word "premises" in ~the policy. The Court
ruled that "premises" included a tire recapping shop
located at the rear of the lot upon which the insured
dwelling stood, and the defendant was liable f'Or the full
value of personal property stored therein which was
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destroyed by fire, rather than ten per cent (10%) of
the value as provided for unscheduled personal property
located "off pren1ises." Defendant appeals frmn this
judgrnent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal·of the judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of law as to the extent
of iis liability as will be herein set forth.
STATEl\tfENT OF FACTS
On June 6, 1961 Plaintiff secured a policy of fire
insurance from Defendant insuring a frame dwelling
used as her home. ' The policy provided inter alia for
coverage on "Unscheduled Personal Property" in the
total amount of Six Thousand D·olla.rs ($6-,000.00). By
the terms of the policy as set forth under the caption
"Coverage C-Unscheduled Personal Property" two
alternatives are provided for:
1. "On Premises: This policy covers unscheduled personal property usual or incidental
to the premises as a dwellirng owned, worn or
used by an insured while on the premises, etc.",
in actual value up to $6,000.00, and
2. "Away Frmn Premises: This policy also
covers unscheduled personal property AS DESCRIBED AND LIMITED· while elsewhere than
on the premises, anywhere in the world, owned,
worn 'Or used by insured * * *. T·HE LIMIT of
this company's liability for such property while
away from premises shall be an additional amount
of insurance equal to ten per cent (10%) of the
2
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amount specified for Coverage C ·and in no event
less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) ."
(En1phasis added)
Located 50 to 75 feet to the rear of the frame
dwelling insured but on the san1e lot was a building
used .as a tire recapping shop by plaintiff's family.
It is not disputed by plaintiff that the insurance rate
on such tire recapping shop was higher than the rate
on the frame dwelling because of the increased fire
hazard inherent in the nature ·of the work done in the
shop. Wbile defendant did not insure rthe tire recapping
shop, it is admitted by plaintiff that she had fire insurance on said recapping shop with another company,
but the fire insurance did not cover any personal property stored therein.
At a time prior to August 2, 1961 and while plaintiff's insurance contract with defendant was in force,
plaintiff stored in the tire recapping shop certain items
of personal property which apparently were an overflow
from the storage facilities in her home. It is admitted
that these iterns of personal property \Yere of a household nature and were not connected with the business
of the tire recapping shop.
On or about August 2, 1961 the tire recapping shop
burned, and the personal property alluded to herein
was destroyed by fire. While the elmnent of darnages
has never been presented to a court or jury, plaintiff
sues for approximately Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as the value of the personal property lost, and
the Insurance Oompany, defendant herein, has· taken

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the position that it is liable only to the extent of ten
per cent (10%) of the actual value of said property as
per the provisions of fhe policy as above set forth,
defendant taking the positron that the destroyed personal property was not on the premises insured. Judge
EUett ruled the recapping shop was a part of the premises which has the effect of 1naking the defendant liable
for the actual value of the destroyed property up to
$6,000.00.
ARGUl\tfENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WORD
"PREMISES" INCLUDED THE TIRE RECAPPING SHOP,
THUS MAKING DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR THE FULL
VALUE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY DESTROYED WHEN
BY A STRICT INTERPRE'TATION OF THE TERMS OF
THE CONTRACT AND THE APPLICABLE LAW THE TIRE
RECAPPING SHOP WAS NOT A PART OF THE PREMISES
INSURED, AND THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY BY THE
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD THEREFORE BE
ONLY TEN PER CENT (10%) OF THE VALUE OF SAID
PERSONAL PROPER'TY, OR $1,000.00, WHICHEVER IS THE
GREATER.

The sole issue of law to be detennined herein is
the definition of the word "premises" as used in the
policy of insurance .as it relates to unscheduled personal
property. If the Court find's ~that the tire recapping
shop is a part of the premises insured by defendant,
then defendant is liable for the actual value of the perS'Onal household property stored and destroyed therein.
Conversely, if the Court finds that the tire recapping
4
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shop was not a part of the premises insured, then the
defendant's liability is lin1ited to ten per cent (10%)
of the value of the personal property, or $1,000.00,
whichever is greater.
In defining "premises" we are not here concerned
with conventional or dictionary definitions. The policy
itself specifically defines the word as it applies to the
contractual relationship of the parties. In at least three
places in the insurance contract the company defines
premises for purposes of its liability assumption. Under
the statement of Declarations appearing at the top of
the first unnumbered page following Page 4 of the contract we read:
"Declarations
The premises occupied by the Named Insured
is situated in a building occupied by not more
than ______ families. The described premises is
occupied by not more than one family in addition to the ~ amed Insured's family and by not
more than two roomers or boarders."
On Page 3, under General Conditions, at 2.(d) we
read:
"General ·Conditions
Premises
The unqualified word "premises" means the
pren1ises described in the Declarations, includnig
grounds, garages, stables and orther outbuildings
incidental thereto, and private approaches thereto." (Emphasis added)
On the face or title page of the contract the tire
recapping shop is excluded from the premises insured
5
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by the staten1ent appearing in the center of said title
page, which reads :
"The described dwelling of frame construction is occupied by not 1nore than two families
and not 1nore than two roomers or hoarders per
fa1nily.... The described dwelling is not seasonal
and no business pursuits are conducted' at the
pre.Jnises thereof: Exceptions if any. (No exceptions noted) (En1phasis added)
From the ahove definitions it is clear that "prmnises"
relates to a "building" (singular and not plural) which
is to be used as a .dwell.ing, together with grounds,
garages, etc., inciilenta.Z to that singular dwelling as a
dwelUVng. A tire recapping shop, therefore, which is
used not as an incident to the occupancy of the dwelling,
but rather as a business operation, does not come within
the definition.
This position is further supported by the fact that
the paragraphs of coverage concerning unseheduled
personal property refer both to the personal property
on premises and the same personal property away from
premises, providing specific coverage in each instanee.
The paragraph relating to personal property on premises
provides "this policy covers unscheduled personal property usual O'r incidental to the occupancy of the premises
as a dwelUmg ... .", again emphasizing a singular building or dwelling and occupancy as a dwelling.
The question of what building or buildings are to
be included in defining premises in an insurance policy
in a fact situation strikingly similar to the one rut bar
appears in the case of R~ckerson v. Gennan-AmeriCO!n
6
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Insurnnce Cornpany of New York, 32 N.Y. Suppl. 1026.
The policy of insurance in that case described the premises insured as "a brick building and additions, No. 160
M Street, occupied by stores and dwellings." There were
in that case a two story brick building occupied as a
store on the ground floor and dwellings on rthe second
floor, with a brick factory building on the rear portion
of the land described. The two buildings were connected
by a frame structure, the walls of which in part were
the walls of the brick buildings. PasS'age from one brick
building to the other was impossible through the frame
structure, except by going through windows. The court
ruled that the rear building was not part of the premises
and not covered by the insurance policy. The court said
in part:
"The question presented is whether the policy
in question covered the rear building as well as
the front. It is to be observed that there is only
one building insured, with the additions to such
building, which it is repr~sented in the policy
were occupied as stores and dwellings. It is
difficult to conceive how the rear building is to
be considered .as an addition to the front building,
there being no connection between the two, because this small frame structure cannot be considered a connection. It certainly was not intended to connect the rear with the front bui~ding,
nor was it used for any such purpose. The fact
of the existence of windows in the front and
rear buildings, making it possible to crawl into
this frame structure, temporary in its nature,
in no manner made t!he large brick faCJtory an
addition to the smaller building on the front.
And furthermore, by the terms of the policy,
the building insured is represented ·as being
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occupied for stores and dw.elli'll[J·s, and it is only
the front building that answers this description.
The rear building was used almost entirely .as a
factory, with a very small portion of it occupied
as a store for the sale of the goods manufactured
therein. Under these circumstances, it is difficult
to see how, under the terms of the policy as it
reads, it is possible to include ~this rear factory
building. As has already been observed, the
buidlings were absolutely independent of each
other, and intended for d.iff erent uses; and the
mere fact that this frame structure adjoined each
building could in no way n1ake the rear building
an addition to the front building, any more than
it could make the front building an addition to
the rear." (Emphasis added)

In the case at bar the building in which the personal
property was located, for the loss of which plaintiff
seeks to recover, was used as a tire recapping shop,
was located sorne distance from the home, had no connection with the home as a home or dwelling, was not
a building appurtenant to the dwelling as a garage or
outdoor privy would be, and can in no wise be considered
a "dwelling." The reasoning of Rickerson v. GermauAJnerican Insurance Company of New York case, supra,
therefore seems compelling here.
The provisions of the policy relating to business
and business pursuits lend further e1nphasis in that
connection. The policy provides on its face "described
dwelling is not seasonal and no business pursuits are
conducted at the prernises thereof;" again it is to be
noted that the word "premises" designates a singular
dwelling as Rickerson, supra, designated a singular
building.
8
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There is some additional case law in a parallel area
where the word "premises" has been construed. Typical
of these holdings is Sexton v. Hawkeye Insurance Company, 69 Iowa 99, 28 NW 462, which held that where ·an
insurance policy provides that if the insured pren1ises
should become vacant the policy should become void,
"premises" referred to the house insured and not to the
land upon which the house was located. The court said
in part:
"Counsel also argue that the condition requiring occupancy applies to the land upon which
the house is situated, and that as it was occupied
the condition has been performed. The ground
of this position is that the land is particularly
described, and the condition declares that if the
premises are vacant, the policy shall become void.
Counsel thinks that the word "prernises" refers
to the land as well as the house. This cannot he
admitted. The land is described in order to designate the location of the house; the land is not
insured; the house is. It is very plain that the
word "premises" refers to the property insured."
(Emphasis added)
There is a further argument which is persuasive
for the position that "premises" includes only the insured
dwelling and any structures appurtenant or incidental
to it as a dwelling. r.rhat is, to permit plaintiff to succeed
here would be to allow him to recover for property in
a building which building itself was not covered by the
terms of the policy. It is admitted by the plaintiff that
the tire recapping shop itself was not insured by defendant, it being a hazard expressly excluded by the tern1s
of the policy. It would offend logic., therefore, to rule
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that personal property used as incidental to ~the occupancy of the dwelling, which is placed in this business
location with its increased hazard, v,~as a risk intended
to he asstuned by the insurer. The logic of this position
is clear, in view of the fact that the policy a·t a reduced
coverage insures said personal property \\·hen "away
from premises."
Finally, in the ease of Ziebarth et 1-tx v. F£delily
and Guaranty Fire Corporation of Baltimo·re, llfaryland, 41 NW 2d 632, Suprmne Court of Wisconsin, a
policy of fire insurance issued on a dwelling house provided that the insured might apply up to ten per cent
(10%) of the full an1ount of insurance on private structures other than the dwelling itself and located on the
p·remises. The insureds therein 'had a two-car frame
garage on the back of their lot. This garage was used
to carry on the business of the insured which was the
repairing of automobiles. The garage burned. The
Supreine Court of \Visconsin held that defendant insurer
was not obliged to pay the ten per cent (10%) of the
policy coverage for the loss of the garage even though
i·t was on the same lot as the insured dwelling under the
following reasoning:
"The policy in question was for a dwelling
house. By referring to private structures appertaining to the dwelling house its coverage was
limited to buildings generally in the individual
and private use of the owner. A car repair shop
which was open to the public was thus definitely
excluded."
It is admit·ted that Zieb,arth, supra, is not precisely
in point with the case at bar but certainly shows the
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reasoning of the courts in defining such .things as premises, private and public uses and related n1atters in this
general field of insurance. It is defendant's position that
unless an item of personal property was either located
in the insured frame dwelling itself or in an outbuilding
directly related to the frame building as a dwelling,
such item or items of personal property, even though
they were 50 feet away from said building, would not
be on the premises as defined by the policy, and their
loss would be compensated by the ten per cent ( 10%)
value provision of the policy, which ten per cent (10%)
valuation would follow such an item of personal property
virtually to the ends of the earth. No loose dictionary
definitions of premises which usually include the entire
parcel of land are applicable here particularly in the
light of the Sexton case, supra, which as above set forth
says: "The land is not insured; the house t"is."
Plaintiff respondent will undoubtedly take the position that the general rule that contracts are to be construed against their composers should operate against
appellant herein. It is clear in the law that this doctrine does not apply when construing the location of the
property insured. See Jefferson County Bank v. Insu.rance Company of the State of Pennsylvanta, (1933) 251
Ky. 502, 65 SvV 2d 474, wherein it was said in part:
"Ordinarily insurance contracts are construed against the insurers, but that is not true
as to the location of the property insured. The
policy will not be extended to property not in the
terms of the description in this respect....
"If the average reasonable man were told
this company had lurnber in its mill, had lmnber
11
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on its open yard, and had insurance on the lumber
on its yard, he would not for a mOinent think the
lun1her in the mill was insured." (E1nphasi~
added)
CONCLUSION
It is respeetfully submitted that the personal property in question was, for the purposes of this lawsuit
and under the tern1s of the policy, "away from premises," and it would be manifestly unjust and offensive
to logic to allow a person to take quantities of furniture,
clothing and other personal property which was virtually
an overflow from their insured dwelling and place said
quantities of personal property in a building used as a
tire recapping shop with a high fire potential haz.ard
and, when the tire recapping shop burns, destroying the
personal property which should have been in the dwelling, to allow him to recover the full amount of the value
of said personal property.
With this in mind the policy very prudently, and
fairly, llinits the insurer's liability to personal property
elsewhere than in the dwelling to the sum of ten per
cent (10%) of the value of the property or $1,000.00,
whichever is the greater.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTIAN RONNOW
@
MABE~ RONNOW &
MADSEN,
574 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
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